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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2634 
 ___________ 
 
 AKINTOYE OMATSOLA LAOYE, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals  
(Agency No. A097-436-415) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 23, 2012 
 
 Before: SLOVITER, SMITH and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  January 27, 2012 ) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Akintoye Omatsola Laoye petitions for review of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of his motion to reconsider.  For the following reasons, we will 
grant his petition.
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I. Background 
Laoye, a native and citizen of Nigeria, entered the United States in September 
1996, as a J-2 non-immigrant exchange visitor.  He adjusted his status to non-immigrant 
student F-1 in 1998, when he attended college at Monmouth University.    
In October 2003, Laoye was convicted in the New Jersey Superior Court, 
Monmouth County, for endangering the welfare of a child under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-
4(a).  He was placed in removal proceedings and was detained by Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) in February 2004.  Laoye was then found removable 
pursuant to INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1277(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien convicted 
of an aggravated felony.  However, in May 2006, the BIA granted Laoye’s unopposed 
motion to reopen, and in June 2006, this Court held that a conviction under N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:24-4(a) does not constitute an aggravated felony under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.  Stubbs v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2006).  Consequently, 
Laoye was released from ICE detainment in July 2006, and in 2007, the Government 
conceded that it could not sustain the aggravated felony removal charge in light of 
Stubbs.     
However, in May 2006, Laoye was charged as removable pursuant to INA § 
237(a)(1)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i), for failure to maintain full-time student 
status at Monmouth University.  Laoye conceded that he was not a full-time student 
during the Fall 2002 semester and had not attended Monmouth University since 2003.   
Therefore, in February 2008, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) determined that Laoye was 
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removable as an “out of status” F-1 student, denied voluntary departure, and ordered him 
removed to Nigeria.  The BIA denied his appeal.  Laoye then filed a petition for review 
with this Court, arguing that he was not out of status because his absence from 
Monmouth University during the Fall 2002 semester was approved by the university and 
he was suspended in 2003.  C.A. No. 08-4878.  He also asserted that he was eligible for 
reinstatement of his F-1 student status because his ICE detention from 2004 to 2006 
prevented him from maintaining his college studies due to circumstances beyond his 
control.  We denied his petition.  In an unpublished opinion filed in November 2009, we 
acknowledged Laoye’s arguments and stated that we were “not unsympathetic to th[ese] 
claim[s,]” but could not consider them because the claims were unexhausted.  We 
informed Laoye that to exhaust the claims, he must first file a motion to reopen before the 
IJ or the BIA.  Laoye v. Att’y Gen., 352 F. App’x 714, 717 (3d Cir. 2009). 
In September 2010, Laoye filed a motion to reopen to exhaust the claims related to 
his out of status charge and based on a pending U visa application.  R. 158-61.  He also 
filed a document, “Motion Disputing Out of Status Charge,” in which he presented his 
arguments regarding his F-1 student status.  He argued that he was not out of status 
because his initial absence from school in 2002 was approved medical leave under 8 
C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(6)(iii)(B) and he was unable to return to school due to his ICE 
detainment, a circumstance beyond his control under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(16)(i)(F)(1).  R. 
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110-19.   The Government responded, addressing only Laoye’s U visa application claim.1  
The BIA denied Laoye’s motion to reopen on April 12, 2011, as number barred and 
untimely.
2
  The BIA stated that Laoye did not demonstrate an exceptional situation to 
warrant sua sponte reopening, and noted that the pendency of Laoye’s U visa did not 
provide a basis for reopening.  The BIA did not address Laoye’s F-1 student status 
arguments. 
Laoye then filed a motion to reconsider and related documents, arguing that the 
BIA failed to discuss his F-1 student status arguments.  R. 11-19, 24-30, 35-38, 51-55.  
The BIA denied Laoye’s motion to reconsider in June 2011, stating that Laoye’s 
arguments regarding his F-1 student status “do not address the issues in [its] previous 
April 12, 2011, decision, and are therefore misplaced.”  On July 17, 2011, Laoye filed a 
petition for review of the BIA’s June 2011 order denying his motion to reconsider.  The 
Government moves for summary denial of the petition for review.
3
  
II. Discussion 
We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of Laoye’s motion to reconsider 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reconsider for 
                                                 
1
 Laoye replied to the Government’s response, filing additional documents 
discussing his U visa application and F-1 student status.  R. 65-77, 82-84.   
 
2
 While his 2008 petition for review was pending, Laoye had filed two motions to 
reopen, which were denied.   
 
3
 The Government’s motion for summary denial of the petition for review was 
referred to this merits panel. 
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abuse of discretion.  Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir. 2005).  We will not 
disturb the BIA’s decision unless it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  Id. 
(internal citation omitted).    
The Government contends that Laoye has waived any challenge to the BIA’s order 
denying his motion to reconsider because he failed to argue that the BIA’s denial of his 
motion to reconsider was an abuse of discretion in his opening brief.  Although Laoye 
does not specifically address the BIA’s denial of his motion to reconsider, Laoye argues 
that he was not afforded the opportunity to dispute the out of status charge and that he is 
eligible for a U visa.  These arguments were raised in his motion to reconsider.  We 
therefore conclude that Laoye has not waived review of the BIA’s order denying his 
motion to reconsider.
4
  Cf. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (pro se pleadings 
should be construed liberally). 
Upon review, we conclude that the BIA did abuse its discretion because of the 
basis on which it denied Laoye’s motion to reconsider.  In his motion to reconsider, 
Laoye argued that the BIA failed to discuss his arguments regarding his F-1 student 
status.  The BIA dismissed this claim, stating that Laoye’s arguments regarding his F-1 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
4
 In his brief, Laoye also argues that his right to due process was denied in his 
initial immigration proceeding.  Our review, however, is limited to the BIA’s decision 
denying Laoye’s motion to reconsider.  See Nocon v. Immigration & Naturalization 
Serv., 789 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Stone v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv., 514 U.S 386, 405-06 (1995) (timely motion to reconsider does not 
toll running of filing period for review of underlying removal order).   
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student status were misplaced because it was not an issue involved in his motion to 
reopen that was denied on April 12, 2011.   
Review of the record, however, shows that Laoye did raise his F-1 student status 
arguments in his motion to reopen and related documents.  Laoye had argued that he was 
not out of status because his initial absence from school in 2002 was approved medical 
leave under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(6)(iii)(B) and he was unable to return to school due to 
circumstances beyond his control under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(16)(i)(F)(1).  Nevertheless, 
the BIA failed to address or acknowledge the F-1 student status issue in denying Laoye’s 
motion to reopen in April 2011.  Consequently, the F-1 student status arguments Laoye 
raised in his motion to reconsider were not misplaced, and the BIA’s denial of Laoye’s 
motion to reconsider was an abuse of discretion.
5
  See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 
549-50 (3d Cir. 2001) (The BIA must “actually consider the evidence and argument that 
a party presents.”).     
Accordingly, we will grant Laoye’s petition for review, vacate the BIA’s decision, 
and remand the matter to the BIA for further proceedings in which the BIA should 
consider Laoye’s arguments with respect to his student status.  The Government’s motion 
                                                 
5
 We reach our conclusion to grant the petition for review exclusively by reason of 
procedural errors.  We do not imply that review of Laoye’s F-1 student status argument 
necessarily leads to the reopening of his case.  See Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 
272 (3d Cir. 2008).   
 
To the extent that Laoye argues that the BIA improperly denied his motion to 
reconsider based on the pendency of Laoye’s U visa, we find that the BIA did not abuse 
its discretion.  See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(1)(ii) (“[t]he filing of a petition for U–1 
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for summary denial of the petition for review is denied. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
nonimmigrant status has no effect on ICE's authority to execute a final order”).  
